One Step Forward Three Years Backwards: Guyana’s Delayed Independence
by
Estherine Adams
On 26 May 2016 Guyana celebrated its golden jubilee of political independence from Britain. While this was an achievement worth the pomp and ceremony that marked this milestone, it also causes one to reflect on the fact that it should have occurred at least three years earlier. Internal and external forces at the conception of the idea of independence for this country, militated against its birthing by 1963. This article thus, aims at providing some insight as to, why the grant of political independence, which was expected earlier, was not realised in British Guiana until May 1966.
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the Second World War Britain, weakened by the war effort, was forced to begin to dismantle her formal colonial empire. The cost of maintaining it was simply too great. This was amplified by the profound changes taking place in international relations because of the evolution of new ideas, concepts and attitudes, with the resultant rise of political consciousness and a general demand for political independence throughout the empire. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the efforts of Gandhi and the Indian Independence Movement, among other factors, had also helped to expose the moral decadence of empire. The objective of Britain therefore became the surrender of the mantle of colonial administration to reliable replacements. This mantle was duly transferred, when on May 26, 1966 Guyana was formally granted political independence with a coalition government between the People’s National Congress (PNC) and the United Force (UF) at the helm. L.F.S. Burnham was appointed Prime Minister.
This grant of independence status occurred later than had been expected. At a Constitutional Conference in London in March 1960, the British Government had committed itself to the principle of political independence for British Guiana “at any time not later than two years after the 1961 general election.” It was decided that the next Conference in 1962 would be used to set a date for independence, which was expected ‘to be fairly early 1963’. Eventually, however, the British Government reneged on this promise and the date of independence was deferred until May 1966. This delay of at least three years was due to several factors.
Prominent among these factors, but not limited to, are: the effects of the suspension of the 1953 Constitution; disunity among the leaders; civil disturbances in the country in 1962, 1963 and 1964; the inability of the three main political parties to agree on a date for independence and an independence constitution; and, the influence exerted by the government of the United States of America.
At the heart of the British Guiana independence struggle was Cheddi Jagan. In 1946 Jagan, a Marxist who had returned from university training in the USA in 1943 formed the Political Affairs Committee (PAC). The PAC was the forerunner of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and Jagan’s ideology became interwoven with that of the party. In its 1951 Constitution the party spelled out as its aims ‘a desire to stimulate political consciousness along socialist lines’. The party’s socialist ideology, expressed in Marxist terms, regarded political independence as involving, not merely a termination of the metropolitan-colony relationship, which had allowed the ‘exploitation of the human and natural resources for the benefit of the few’, but a transference of the power whereby ‘each should receive according to his contribution of the country’s income and eventually according to his needs’. This ideology, expressed at any other time, may not have appeared alarming, but when taken in the context of the Cold War being waged at the time, it proved to have a detrimental effect on the movement.
This Cold War was born at the end of World War II. It was a new war; one that this time though was not being directly fought with guns and bombs.
“It was a battle for ideas, a battle to justify one or the other ideology; a struggle for the control of smaller nations and their resources, a battle to maintain control of strategic geographic areas.” This battle was waged mainly between the USSR and her allies who were ‘Communist’ and the United States of America and her allies, which included Great Britain, who were ‘Capitalists’.
The cold war was more than ever before, the association with great power rivalry and rival social philosophies, and it was during this period, when the Cold War was being pursued with great vigour and venom, and there was an intense fear of Communism in the USA, that the PPP came to power. Essentially, the factors mentioned above, which contributed to the delay of independence for British Guiana can be traced back to the perceived danger of the Marxist-Socialist ideology in a Cold War World. It was owing to the perceived notion that the PPP was trying to turn British Guiana into a Communist country, that the British justified their suspension of the 1953 Constitution. This suspension factored considerably into to the split that occurred in the PPP in 1955. Though debatable, ideological differences did play a role in the split between the leaders of the PPP, with one group being considered extreme and the other moderate. Jagan and the PPP’s ideological stance ostensibly led to growing interest and involvement of the government of the USA, which, through fear that British Guiana would follow Communist Cuba, persuaded the British government not to grant independence when they had promised to. It was also used to justify the involvement of the CIA in the internal conflicts in British Guiana, whether as instigators or as supporters. This must be taken in the context that the British wanted to achieve the transition of power from itself to the political organizations and leadership that they regarded as ‘acceptable’; given Jagan’s socialist leanings, he was not seen as ‘acceptable’. Overall, it was a combination of these factors, at the heart of which lay the ideological stance of the PPP that offers some insight into why British Guiana was not granted political independence before May 1966.
SUSPENSION OF THE 1953 CONSTITUTION, NO INDEPENDENCE
On 27 April 1953 a general election was held in British Guiana in accordance with the provisions recommended by the Waddington Constitution Commission. The PPP swept the polls in the election, winning 18 out of 24 available seats in the House of Assembly. The leader of the party, Cheddi Jagan became Premier of British Guiana and Forbes Burnham, the party’s chairman, Minister of Education.
The new government swore allegiance to the British Crown in April 1953, but on 9 October 1953, six months after or 133 days later, the Conservative government of Winston Churchill suspended the colony’s new constitution, expelled the government from office and sent troops to the colony to deal with any protest that might occur. It entrusted the administration of the colony to an interim government of approved individuals until a new constitution was devised and another general election held.
In its official public declaration explaining reason for its drastic action, the Colonial Office stated that, “Her Majesty’s Government have decided that the constitution of British Guiana must be suspended to prevent Communist subversion of the government and a dangerous crisis, both in public order and in economic affairs ... The faction in power has shown by their acts and their speeches that they are prepared to go to any lengths, including violence, to turn British Guiana into a Communist state.”
Once the PPP were in office they embarked on a programme of immediate reforms, which led to conflict with the Colonial Officers, the anti-PPP politicians and the entrenched sugar interest. Action that the new government took in the Legislative Assembly included lifting the ban on the entry into British Guiana of West Indians judged politically subversive and attempted to annul the Undesirable Publications Act. Even though half the Guianese population was non-Christian, 95 per cent of the schools were run by Christian denominations. The PPP was determined to institute governmental supervision and direct administrations in schools. The excise, sugar and acreage taxes were to be restored. Even though these and other reforms attempted by the early PPP were quite modest, they were met with great hostility.
Another source of conflict was their inability to work with the Governor and many other top colonial civil servants who exhibited great reluctance in cooperating with the new ministers, knowing that it meant a lessening of their own power. Then in October 1953, the PPP introduced a Labour Regulations Bill. Aimed at minimising inter-union rivalry, the Bill was an attempt by the PPP to get rid of the Man Power Citizens’ Association, the union which officially represented the sugar workers, but whose actions often times favoured the sugar interests. By the passage of the Bill employers were to be required by law to negotiate with the trade unions enjoying majority support.
This move upset the sugar interest since they would be compelled to grant recognition to the Guiana Industrial Workers’ Union (GIWU) at the expense of the MPCA. To them, this Labour Relations Bill was a "communist measure" and they were part of the forces that demanded that the British Government remove the PPP from power. On the day that the Bill was introduced, the GIWU, called a twenty-five days strike paralyzing the sugar industry. This strike provided ‘proof’ of the ministers transgressions to the British government and although the sugar strike ended on 24 September 1953, the decision to suspend the constitution was not reversed.
The 1953 Constitution, although limited in many areas, was the first step towards self-government, one step away from independence. However, with the suspension of this constitution, as stated by Winston McGowan, it was essentially a case of “turning back the clock”, since Guiana was reverted to a full Crown Colony Government, that is, they were no elected members in the Legislative Council. Total power was once again in the hands of the Governor who appointed an Interim Government consisting of small group of conservative politicians, businessmen, and civil servants many of whom were unsuccessful candidates from the 1953 elections that lasted until 1957. As such, British Guiana, instead of advancing towards independence, took a significant step backwards.
NO UNITY, NO INDEPENDENCE
The failure of major political leaders to cooperate impeded the independence movement in British Guiana and was significant as it related to the delay of independence. The joint biracial leadership of the independence movement by Jagan and Burnham had been making strides despite the suspension of the 1953 constitution. Disunity however manifested itself as soon as power was in the hands of the leaders. The party was divided into pro-Burnham and pro-Jagan camps. Burnham’s followers wanted him as leader, while Jagan’s followers wanted him. This disunity developed to the point where it led to the split of the PPP on 13 February 1955 into Burnham and Jagan factions. Apart from ideological differences between the two leaders, there was factionalism with respect to tactics, race, personal ambitions and jealousies.
The issue of factionalism is of great significance because of the very negative effect it has been found to have on the success of social movements. It begins when
“the new faction competes with the parent for resources. External supporters will at best be divided between factions; at worse they will be too frustrated to support either faction or they will be divided in loyalty and easily alienated. To compete for resources, leaders of each faction will highlight and enhance the differences between them. Each faction, seeing the other as the greatest obstacle to its own success, will spend even more effort on attacking former allies.”
This became the Guiana experience. The split in the ranks of the PPP in 1955 was eventually accompanied by racial politics. While clearly multi-racial in leadership, the PPP depended heavily on the appeal of each of its leaders of his particular ethnic group for support. Hence, the strength of the party lay in Jagan’s support from the East Indian population and on Burnham’s black support. While Jagan and Burnham were together the races cooperated, then the split occurred. By the start of the campaign in connection with the 1957 election there were charges and counter charges of parties appealing to certain racial groups to vote for them on a basis of race. It was therefore evident that the attempt to forge a concerted group, and action against colonialism had ended in disaster. British Guiana was much more divided than it ever was before the emergence of the PPP, because although the leaders were still fighting for independence, they were doing so at opposite ends of the spectrum.
CIVIL DISTURBANCES, NO INDEPENDENCE
The spate of social upheavals during the period of 1962 to 1964 had made British Guiana ungovernable and militated against the grant of independence for the country prior to 1966. The first in a series of crises occurred in 1962, the occasion being the presentation of the government’s budget, which became known as the Kaldor budget, after its formulator. It attempted to raise funds for economic development mainly through tapping domestic sources of capital.
The budget encountered very strong opposition from the PNC and UF, some of the business interests, newspapers and the trade union movement, which called a strike. The disturbances culminated in widespread violence and arson in Georgetown on February 16, 1962. When he disturbances, which came to be known as “Black Friday”, came to an end there were serious consequences for the country. The biggest damage was, however, done to the PPP regime, which was unable to maintain order in Georgetown, and had to call on British arms to assist in maintaining control. The February disturbances postponed the new Constitutional Conference, which was scheduled for May 1962, to discuss and fix the date of Guyana’s independence, until October 1962.
The following year, 1963, witnessed further disturbances. The 80-days strike, as it was dubbed, stemmed from the introduction of the Labour Relations Bill. One of the key political objectives of the Bill was to replace the company union, the MPCA, with GAWU, which was controlled by the PPP. The Trade Union Congress (TUC) called a general strike. This strike was supported by the MPCA, the PNC, the UF, the Georgetown Chambers of Commerce, the police force and mainly by the American-controlled, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), of which the TUC was an affiliate. During the strike, the ICFTU organised a general blockade of air and sea traffic to Guyana and supplied money and food to the strikers, which aided in prolonging the strike.
Violence became a daily occurrence throughout the strike and racial relations deteriorated. The strike finally ended on July 8 with nine people dead, and many more injured. The colony-wide civil strife brought the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Sandys to Guyana, and from his visit he was persuaded to hold another independence conference in October 1963.
The third crisis was somewhat different in nature. It was also the most serious in nature. In late January, 1964, the PPP launched what Dr. Jagan called
“a hurricane of protest” in order “to afford our supporter the opportunity to demonstrate their confidence in the leaders of the party in the face of the British Government’s betrayal at the London Conference.”
The PPP sought to create widespread disruption in the colony to dissuade Britain from implementing the Sandy’s decision, which had decided all issues against the PPP at the London Independence Conference. Incidence of violence broke out in January and by the end of July, over 170 persons, mainly people of African and East Indian ancestry, died. There was widespread destruction of property and thousands of persons fled their home districts. Conditions had deteriorated so badly that a State of Emergency was declared. Eventually the volatile civil disturbances, which featured prominently during the 1962-1964 period, became a major obstacle in Britain granting political independence before 1966.
NO CONSENSUS, NO INDEPENDENCE
Inability of the three main political parties to agree on an independence constitution and a date for independence also militated against the granting of independence before 1966. The constitutional movement after the PPP electoral victory of 1957 was towards self-government and political independence. The British Guiana Constitutional Conference was held in London in March 1960. The Secretary of State convened the conference for the colonies at the request of the British Guiana Legislature, ‘to consider what measures of constitutional advance should take place in British Guiana’. Considerable controversy arose as to whether the Legislature should be bi-cameral or unicameral, and whether the electoral system should be first-past-the-post or proportional representation. The PNC reiterated its support for internal self-government, as a step in the process towards political independence. The PPP delegation demanded political independence by August 1961. At the end of this first conference it was decided that only internal self-government was to be conferred.
The October 1962 Constitutional Conference was held against the background of violent disturbances, which occurred in February of that year. It was therefore of little surprise when the leaders of the three parties failed to reach agreement on whether (a) elections should be based on first-past-the-post or proportional representation system; (b) the age of voting should be reduced to 18 or remain at 21; and (c) elections should be held before independence. Unable to reach agreement, the conference collapsed two weeks later.
A third conference was held in October 1963. When talks opened it became clear that the three leaders had failed to reach agreement on the outstanding issues. Consequently, the three leaders signed a letter agreeing to allow the British government “to settle on their authority all outstanding constitutional issues”. On October 31, Sandys announced his decision, incorporating a change in the electoral system from first-past-the-post voting to proportional representation and ordering a general election in 1964. The voting age remained at twenty-one, and, after new elections, another independence conference would be scheduled.
The failure of the three leaders to agree on the most pressing issues at the Constitutional Conferences led to the failure of the first two and it was only after the intervention of Mr. Sandys that a solution was arrived at. The failure of these conferences caused British Guiana to suffer a setback and ultimately delayed independence.
THE UNITED STATES SPEAKS, NO INDEPENDENCE
The United States government only began to show obvious interest in the politics of British Guiana after the formation in 1950 of the PPP, a Marxist-oriented Party in the era of the Cold War, marked by intense fear in the US of Communism. The US government was completely opposed to the idea of British Guiana proceeding to independence under a PPP government. American concerns about British Guiana grew significantly after Castro’s successful revolution in Cuba in 1959 and Cuba’s subsequent emergence as a Marxist state.
The US made it clear that they were not prepared to tolerate another Cuba on the mainland of South America. Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, stated that, “the United States does not object in principle to British Guiana independence. However, we are gravely concerned over the prospect of communism gaining a toe-hold on the South American mainland...Accordingly we hope that the sub-committee will not pressure United Kingdom to grant British Guiana independence ...”
The United States government resorted to a variety of tactics in their effort to get the British government to modify its plans for independence of British Guiana. Particularly after the re-election of the PPP in 1961, the US government actively supported efforts to overthrow the government. Destabilizing efforts by local opposition political parties and trade unions, heavily backed by funding from US sources, found ready support from the Kennedy administration. The US government welcomed the 1962 disturbances, which were supported by the CIA, because they felt that the British government would delay independence of British Guiana, as they desired.
A clear picture of the role played by the US in the delay of independence for British Guiana was summed up in an article written by Drew Pearson, a US Columnist, published under the caption “Castro and Jagan”, on March 22, 1964. “The US permitted Cuba to go Communist purely through default and diplomatic bungling. The problem now is to look ahead and make sure we don’t make the mistake again...But in British Guiana, President Kennedy, having been badly burnt in the Bay of Pigs operation, did look ahead. Though it was not published at the time, this was the secret reason why Kennedy took his trip to England in the summer of 1963...but London was ahead of his itinerary only because of Kennedy’s haunting worry that British Guiana would get independence from England in July 1963 and set up another communist government under the guidance of Castro. If this happens just before the US Presidential elections of 1964 and if at that time the Communist Guiana began seizing the Reynolds Metals Aluminium operation and other American properties, Kennedy knew the political effects would be disastrous...the main thing that they agreed on was that the British would refuse to grant independence to Guiana because of the general strike against pro-Communist PM Cheddi Jagan.” The Americans concluded that Jagan’s ties with Communist Cuba were posing problems to them and to Kennedy’s re-election bid, and thus were willing to use non-democratic and ‘covert activity’ to remedy the situation.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, after the Second World War Britain was forced to embark on a massive decolonisation campaign. British Guiana, as a colony of Britain was entitled to independence and it was expected that she would have received independence as early as 1963, but this was delayed. The Marxist ideological stance taken by the PPP, which had hoped to win independence for Guyana, greatly impeded the movement. This was exacerbated by the suspension of the 1953 Constitution, 133 days after it was enacted, which, in actuality took the movement a step backward as full Crown Colony Government was introduced. The British Government as justification for this decision used the Communist ideology of the party.
The bid for early independence was not helped by the splits that occurred in the PPP party; a split that firstly occurred primarily because of ideological incompatibility and personality conflicts, and a second more damaging split which was essentially race based. The inability of the principal leaders to unite impacted the movement and delayed, since instead of joining forces to combat a common enemy, they expended their time and resources fighting each other. The old colonial tactic of divide and conquer was once effectively applied as the Colonial powers stoked the fires of discord. These leaders seemingly forgot the old adage, ‘in unity there is strength’. One can be tempted to accuse the leaders of being selfish and not putting the interest of the country before their own.
Further, it took three Constitutional conferences for an independence constitution to be formulated and for a date for independence to be decided. The inability of the principal leaders of the three main political parties, PPP, PNC and UF, to arrive at a consensus on critical issues, resulted in the rescheduling of the first two conferences, which contributed to the delay of independence for Guyana.
The disturbances, which shook the country in the early years of the 1960s, presented the British government with another opportunity to intervene directly in the affairs of the Colony and to assume greater control of public affairs through the Governor and to once again delay the granting of independence. The disturbances ostensibly showed Jagan’s inability to manage the internal affairs of the colony and provided the excuse that the British government needed to delay the granting of independence.
Finally, and more importantly, the subtle and sometimes direct role played by the government of United States of America, also had an impact on when Guyana would be granted political independence. Here again, this development was attributed to Jagan and the PPP’s Marxist philosophy. The USA under no circumstance was prepared to allow British Guiana to gain independence under a PPP Communist regime. Such a move had devastating political implications, not only for British Guiana, but also for the United States as it could have direct bearing on the re-election bid on arguably one of the most powerful man in the world. Accordingly, they exerted themselves, to the point of threatening Anglo-American alliances, and supporting internal conflicts against the PPP, to ensure that this did not happen. America’s views, more than likely, must have been taken into consideration by Duncan Sands when he made his decision at the 1963 Constitutional Conference. This was the decision that sounded the death knell for the PPP government at the 1964 General Election, and subsequently independence under the PNC/UF coalition. It was the combination of these factors that proved catastrophic and furnishes the explanation as to why the grant of political independence, which was expected earlier, was not realized in British Guiana until 26 May 1966.
End notes
Theo Morris, “Guyana Independence Struggle Part VII,” Stabroek News, 4 June 1996.
2Maurice St. Pierre, Anatomy of Resistance: Anti-Colonialism in Guyana 1823-1966 (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1999), p. 165.
3Ralph Premdas, Ethnic Conflict and Development: The Case of Guyana (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Co., 1996), p. 169.
4St. Pierre, p. 88.
5Hamilton Green, From Pain to Peace: Guyana 1953-1964 (Georgetown: Tropical Airways Inc., 1987), p. 39.
6Ibid.
7Forbes Burnham, A Destiny to Mould (London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1970), p. xvii.
8Winston McGowan, “Turning Back the Clock: The Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution in 1953 Part II”, Stabroek News, 7 Nov 2002.
9Thomas J Spinner, A Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945-1983 (Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 39.
10Reynold Burrowes, The Wild Coast: An Account of Politics in Guyana (Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1984), p. 53.
11Jai Narine Singh, Guyana: Democracy Betrayed. A Political History 1948-1993 (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Ltd., 1996), p. 53.
12St. Pierre, p. 97-98.
13R. Scott Frey, et. al., “Characteristics of Successful American Protest Groups: Another Look at Gamson’s ‘Strategy of Social Protest’”, American Journal of Sociology, No. 2, (September 1992), p. 384.
14Percy Hintzen, “The Colonial Foundation of Race Relations and Ethno-Politics in Guyana”, History Gazette, No. 65, (February 1994), p. 23.
15Harold Lutchman, From Colonialism to Cooperative Republic. Aspects of Political Development in Guyana (Rio Piedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1974), p. 223-224.
16Premdass, p. 99.
17Lutchman, p. 229.
18Spinner, p. 99.
19Lutchman, p. 229.
20Premdass, pp. 105-106.
21Spinner, p. 102.
22Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial My Fight For Guyana’s Freedom (St John: Hansib Caribbean, 1997, p. 350.
23Lutchman, p. 229.
24Edwin Ali, The Rise of the Phoenix in Guyana’s Turbulent Politics (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1997), p. 17.
25Jagan, p. 202.
26St. Pierre, p. 160.
27Lutchman, p. 228.
28Spinner, p. 103
29McGowan, “Part 1”
30L S Daniels (ed.), Declassified Documents on British Guiana: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII (Washington: US State Department, 1996), p. 228.
31Andrew Morrison, Justice: The Struggle for Democracy in Guyana (Georgetown: Red Thread Press, 1996), p. 30.
32Sallahuddin, Guyana: The Struggle for Liberation 1945-1992 (Georgetown: Guyana National Printers Ltd., 1994), pp. 262-263.
